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Measuring the Relationship between Audit Committee Characteristics and 
Earnings Management: Evidence from New Zealand Listed Companies 
 
by 
Moau Yong Toh 
 
The recent corporate accounting scandals, such as the Enron scandal in 2001 and the WorldCom 
scandal in 2002, have increasingly drawn the attention of regulators around the globe to the 
monitoring role of audit committees in the financial reporting process. The purpose of this study 
is to investigate the relationship between the NZX’s recommendations on audit committee 
characteristics and earnings management in NZX listed companies. In particular, this study 
examines the relationships between earnings management and audit committee size, 
independence, financial expertise and diligence, as per the NZX’s recommendations. This study 
finds that the NZX’s recommendations that audit committees should comprise a majority of 
independent directors and at least one financial expert are associated with lower earnings 
management. Besides, companies whose audit committees meet at least quarterly report lower 
earnings management. Since the NZX does not recommend best practice for audit committee 
meetings, this finding has implications for New Zealand regulators and practitioners that meeting 
at least quarterly is a key criterion of audit committee effectiveness, hence, a change to corporate 
governance rules and principles may be necessary. However, this study finds that audit 
committee size is not related to lower earnings management, suggesting that detection and 
control of earnings management relies more on the independence, financial expertise and 
iii 
 
diligence of audit committees to generate quality discussions and monitoring duties. Except for 
the U.S.A., the results of this study do not differ materially from other major countries, such as 
Australia. This study contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence about the 
relationship between audit committee characteristics, as per the NZX’s recommendations, and 
earnings management in countries with similar institutional and legal environment to New 
Zealand. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The transparency and reliability of financial information through reporting and disclosure 
practices is of paramount importance in corporate governance, as it allows stakeholders to make 
informed decisions to protect their interests (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2002; 
Securities Commission New Zealand (SCNZ), 2004). Since the corporate collapses of Enron in 
2001 and WorldCom in 2002, there has been much criticism of and questions asked about the 
effectiveness of audit committees in overseeing the corporate reporting process and in 
monitoring the independence of external auditors. Meanwhile, earnings management has become 
a specific area of concern in quality financial reporting practices (Drever et al., 2007). Earnings 
management is defined as the use of management’s discretion over operating decisions and 
accounting choices to decrease, stabilize or increase reported earnings for various purposes, such 
as beating financial analysts’ forecasts, increasing managers’ compensation and avoiding 
takeover attempts (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011; Drever et al., 2007). Earnings management 
hides the true corporate performance from stakeholders and destroys organizational value; hence, 
it is an agency cost within the company.  
 
To restore investor confidence in the quality of financial information in the wake of the recent 
accounting scandals, in July 30, 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S.A. 
amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) which has required, for the first time at a statutory level, all issuers in the U.S.A. to 
establish an audit committee as a subcommittee of the board of directors and has revised the 
requirements for the composition and responsibilities of the audit committees in the issuers in 
2 
 
order to protect the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders (SEC, 2002). For instance, 
Section 301(3) requires all audit committee members to be independent directors of the issuer, 
and Section 202(1) requires the audit committee of the issuer to pre-approve all auditing services 
and non-audit services provided by the external auditor of the issuer for the purpose of ensuring 
the auditor’s independence and the objective oversight of the financial reporting process and 
audits of the financial statements of the issuer. Following SOX, corporate governance reforms 
have been undertaken in many countries across the world, with the key provisions of SOX for 
audit committees adopted at either a mandatory or a voluntary level (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2003). These reforms include the U.K. Corporate Governance Code, issued by the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) (2012), the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best 
Practice Recommendations, issued by the Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council (ASX CGC) (2003), and the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, issued by the 
Securities Commission Malaysia (SCM) (2012). 
 
New Zealand has a regulated market and public reporting regime, and has generally been 
perceived as the least corrupt nation in the world (Transparency International (NZ), 2010). Yet, 
when reviewing New Zealand corporate failures between 2001 and 2010, it is found that over 36 
listed companies were put into liquidation or receivership (Peursem & Chan, 2012). Those 
companies showed very little predictability or advance warning about their going concern 
problems until the years of their liquidation. For example, in the Feltex Carpets Limited case, an 
unqualified audit opinion was issued on its last financial statements, that were the 2005 first half 
year financial statements, by its auditor, Ernst & Young, before the company went into 
liquidation (Gregor, 2010). The likelihood of its collapse was unknown, which would otherwise 
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have allowed its investors to make informed decisions to avoid huge losses. This scenario sends 
a signal to New Zealand regulators and practitioners that New Zealand listed companies are not 
as ethical as perceived and that improvements on corporate governance regulations and 
principles are necessary from time to time.  
 
To keep New Zealand’s security markets on a par with other developed countries’ security 
markets, the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) issued rule changes to corporate governance, 
which incorporate the NZX Corporate Governance Best Practice Code (the Code) and a number 
of amendments to the NZX Listing Rules in 2003 (Wu, 2012). In particular, paragraph 3.6 of the 
Listing Rules requires all issuers to have an audit committee comprising at least three members, 
with a majority of independent directors, and at least one member of the committee should have 
an accounting or financial background (NZX Limited, 2012). In New Zealand, the establishment 
of audit committees in issuers follows the voluntary “comply or explain” approach, because the 
Code recognizes differences in corporate size and culture (Sharma, Sharma, & 
Ananthanarayanan, 2011; NZX Limited, 2012). This means that, despite compliance with the 
Code being voluntary and flexible, issuers are required to explain the reasons for not establishing 
audit committees. This requirement is especially stated under NZX Listing Rule 10.5.5 (h) that 
requires annual reports to include a statement of any corporate governance policies, practices and 
processes adopted or followed by the issuer, and under NZX Listing Rule 10.5.5 (i) that requires 
a statement on whether and, if so, how the corporate governance principles adopted or followed 
by the issuer differ materially from the Code (NZX Limited, 2012). Furthermore, in order to 
assist boards of directors of all types of New Zealand entities to achieve consistently high 
standards in carrying out their corporate governance duties and responsibilities, the Financial 
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Markets Authority (FMA) released Corporate Governance in New Zealand Principles and 
Guidelines (the Principles) in February 2004 (SCNZ, 2004)
1
. The Principles do not impose any 
new legal obligations on New Zealand issuers, because the corporate governance principles and 
guidelines, including those related to audit committee independence and expertise set out in 
Principle 3.4, are consistent with the Code and the NZX Listing Rules.  
 
1.2 Research Background 
Following the global corporate governance reforms, much corporate governance research has 
focused on audit committee effectiveness in financial reporting areas, such as earnings 
management, audit qualification and restatement. Amongst these, the relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and earnings management is the most popular research topic, with 
most literature situated in the U.S.A. For example, Klein (2002) finds a negative relationship 
between earnings management and audit committees with a majority of independent directors, 
but fails to observe an association between earnings management and wholly independent audit 
committees. In contrast, Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) find that aggressive earnings 
management is negatively related to audit committees with solely independent directors and with 
at least one financial expert. However, they do not find an association between earnings 
management and the frequency of meetings and size of audit committees. In addition, Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt (2003) report that the size and independence of audit committees are not 
associated with earnings management, but the financial background of committee members and 
the frequency of committee meetings are negatively associated with earnings management.  
 
                                                          
1
 The Financial Markets Authority (FMA) replaced the Securities Commission New Zealand on 1 May 2011. 
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Similar to the U.S.A. empirical studies, studies outside the U.S.A. also produce mixed evidence 
about the relationship between audit committee characteristics and earnings management. 
Research in Australia by Davidson, Stewart and Kent (2005) finds a negative association 
between earnings management and audit committees with a majority of independent directors, 
but they do not observe any association for fully independent audit committees, audit committee 
size and frequency of committee meetings.  In addition, Baxter and Cotter (2009) find that a 
greater proportion of financial experts in audit committees is associated with lower earnings 
management for Australian listed companies. Earnings management is not found to be related to 
the size, independence and frequency of meetings of the committees. Nevertheless, their results 
contradict with those of Kent, Routledge, & Stewart (2010) who find negative associations 
between earnings management and the size, independence and frequency of meetings of audit 
committees. In Malaysia, Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2007) find that earnings management is 
negatively related to wholly independent audit committees.  
 
Studies of audit committees and earnings management for New Zealand companies are scarce. 
The only relevant study in this area is Kuang’s (2007) study that examines the relationships 
between aggressive earnings management and audit committee independence, expertise, multiple 
directorships and members’ shareholdings, based on 150 NZX listed companies, for the financial 
years ending in 2004 and 2005. He reports negative associations between aggressive earnings 
management and audit committees with a majority of independent directors and at least one 
financial expert. He also finds positive associations between aggressive earnings management 
and audit committee members’ shareholdings and multiple directorships. However, wholly 
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independent audit committees and audit committee size are not found to be associated with 
aggressive earnings management for the New Zealand listed companies. 
 
1.3 Statement of Research Problem 
New Zealand is chosen as the study setting because it has a relatively small public capital market 
compared to other developed countries like the U.S.A., the U.K., Canada and Australia. The 
scale of and participation in the New Zealand public capital market is limited by two main 
reasons (Capital Market Development Taskforce Secretariat, 2012). First, New Zealand publicly-
traded companies are smaller in size than public companies in overseas markets, leading to a 
relatively small total market capitalization. Second, the New Zealand larger companies are 
mostly owned by overseas companies and central or local governments. This has made those 
companies less available for investment in equity markets (Capital Market Development 
Taskforce Secretariat, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, New Zealand is chosen because its litigious jurisdiction associated with corporate 
ethical conduct and accounting failures is less stringent compared to the U.S.A., the U.K. and 
Australia (Transparency International (NZ), 2010; Sharma et al., 2011). For instance, although 
bribery is a crime under the Crimes Act 1961, New Zealand citizens or residents engaging in 
bribery of foreign government officials can receive an imprisonment term of up to seven years, 
while, in Australia, the maximum jail term for bribing a foreign official is ten years 
(Transparency International (NZ), 2010). Also, while the U.S.A. laws protect whistleblowers, 
there is no such regulation in New Zealand (Sharma et al., 2011). Consequently, effective 
corporate governance systems may not be in place and the incentives for corporate managers to 
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take risks and manage earnings may be greater. According to Transparency International (NZ) 
(2010), only 72 percent of NZX 50 companies have systems in place to protect whistleblowers 
and to encourage employees to report breaches of code of ethics. The lack of a whistleblower 
culture within New Zealand companies could hamper the detection of earnings management. 
 
In summary, the smaller, less litigious and less regulated environment in New Zealand suggests 
that corporate directors may have fewer incentives and powers to safeguard the integrity of 
financial reporting than directors in larger markets do (Kuang, 2007). Many prior studies about 
the relationship between audit committee characteristics and earnings management have referred 
to large and regulated capital markets, and found significant relationships between earnings 
management and some of the audit committee characteristics (Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Bedard et 
al., 2004; Klein, 2002; Saleh et al., 2007; Xie et al., 2003). Whether or not these findings can be 
generalized to the small and unique New Zealand market requires further research. Since not 
many studies have been conducted to examine the effectiveness of audit committees in 
overseeing financial reporting processes in New Zealand, this study aims to examine audit 
committee effectiveness in the context of earnings management in NZX listed companies.  
 
1.4 Statement of Research Objectives 
An effective audit committee requires qualified members with the authority and resources to 
protect stakeholder interests by ensuring reliable financial reporting, internal controls, and risk 
management through its diligent oversight efforts (DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed, 
2002). This definition highlights four dimensions of audit committee effectiveness, namely 
composition, authority, resources and diligence, which are essential for the fulfilment of the audit 
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committee’s basic fiduciary responsibility assigned by the board of directors and for the 
protection of stakeholder interests
2
. The NZX Listing Rules address these dimensions by 
recommending that an issuer’s audit committee has a minimum of three members, a majority of 
the members are independent and at least one member should have an accounting or financial 
background (NZX Limited, 2012). Besides, an audit committee should meet regularly in the 
process of discharging its responsibilities, which often requires the members to work together to 
monitor and review the independent external and internal auditing practices, to review and 
question management’s financial reporting judgment, to provide an information flow among the 
board of directors, internal auditors, external auditors and company management, and to appoint 
and remove external auditors. Hence, the objectives of this study are:  
i. to examine the relationships between audit committee size, independence, financial expertise 
and diligence per the NZX’s recommendations and earnings management in NZX listed 
companies; 
ii. to provide recommendations on audit committee attributes for policy makers and practitioners 
to best meet the expectations placed on audit committees by various stakeholders.  
 
1.5 Research Importance and Contribution 
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence on the effectiveness of 
audit committee characteristics per the NZX’s recommendations in influencing earnings 
management in New Zealand issuers. To date, the only relevant literature in this area is Kuang’s 
(2007) study, which examined the relationships between aggressive earnings management and 
audit committee independence, expertise, multiple directorships and members’ shareholdings, 
                                                          
2
 See DeZoort et al. (2002) for a discussion of the four dimensions of audit committee effectiveness.  
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based on 150 NZX listed companies, for the financial years ending in 2004 and 2005. In his 
additional analysis, the measurements of audit committee independence and expertise adopted in 
the main analysis were altered according to the NZX’s recommendations to allow a further 
investigation into the relationships between aggressive earnings management and audit 
committee size, independence and expertise per the NZX’s recommendations. He found that 
aggressive earnings management is negatively related to audit committees that have a majority of 
independent directors and at least one financial expert. This study extends Kuang (2007)’s study 
by recognizing and examining the moderating effect of audit committee diligence on the 
likelihood of earnings management by New Zealand issuers. Furthermore, this study 
differentiates itself from Kuang (2007)’s study by measuring earnings management as a 
continuous variable, rather than categorizing earnings management into only two groups, which 
are aggressive earnings management and unaggressive earnings management. Measuring 
earnings management as a continuous variable has an advantage over using a binary measure, 
because it retains the variance in earnings management that would otherwise be removed as a 
result of grouping earnings management into two broad categories. In this study, a continuous 
variable of earnings management is used in an effort to shed new light on the relationships 
between earnings management and audit committee characteristics.  
 
This study provides assistance to policymakers, academics and corporate practitioners both 
overseas and in New Zealand, because there is limited research on the monitoring role of audit 
committee in earnings management in small equity markets. The study fills this gap in the 
literature by providing empirical evidence of how the audit committee attributes consistent with 
the NZX’s recommendations are effective or ineffective in moderating earnings management 
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practices and ensuring the integrity of financial reporting in companies traded in small equity 
markets. The findings of this study, hence, can serve as a benchmark for corporate governance 
and regulation setting in small countries with similar institutional and legal environments to New 
Zealand.  
 
1.6 Dissertation Outline 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will provide the literature 
review and hypotheses. Chapter 3 details the research methodology, which includes the 
measurements of the variables and the processes of sample selection and data collection. Chapter 
4 discusses the findings of the descriptive and substantive analyses of the research. The 
dissertation is concluded in the last chapter, with a discussion of the limitations of the study and 
possible future areas for research.   
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Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the literature review of earnings management and the audit committee 
characteristics of size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. A hypothesis will be 
developed after the literature review of each audit committee characteristic. At the end of this 
chapter, a summary of empirical research on the effectiveness of audit committee characteristics 
in monitoring earnings management is provided. 
 
2.2 Earnings Management 
Earnings management is defined as the use of managers’ discretion over operating decisions and 
accounting choices to present favourable financial performance of a company by reducing, 
stabilizing or increasing reported earnings (Drever et al., 2007). This definition highlights the 
fact that earnings management can be of an income-deceasing or income-increasing nature, and 
is primarily achieved by management actions through operating decisions and accounting 
choices from among Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP) (McKee, 2005). 
Examples of operating decisions would be whether or not to provide a sales discount, hire 
additional employees or invest in new machinery near the end of a reporting year; these 
decisions will directly influence the reported earnings for the year. In this study, earnings 
management through accounting choices is of interest. Under GAAP, reporting entities are 
required to prepare financial statements using the accrual basis of accounting. The nature of the 
accrual basis, however, leaves accounting records open to opportunistic manipulation by the 
company management. In contrast to the cash basis, under the accrual basis the effects of 
12 
 
transactions are recognized and reported in the financial statements of the periods in which they 
occur, regardless of when the cash or its equivalent is received or paid (NZICA, 2012). This 
creates an opportunity for corporate managers who have an information asymmetry advantage to 
manage earnings creatively by bringing revenues into years of “need” and deferring expenses 
into subsequent years while still complying with GAAP
3
. This practice of earnings management 
is also known as creative accounting. An example of this practice is, in New Zealand, managers 
can switch from a non-current assets’ depreciation method to another as long as they can justify 
why applying the new accounting policy provides more reliable and relevant information and 
they make the necessary disclosures according to NZIAS 8, paragraph 29 (NZICA, 2012).  
 
In the context of publicly-listed companies, earnings management is primarily used for beating 
financial analysts’ forecasts. In public capital markets, financial analysts spend a considerable 
amount of resources analyzing corporate performances and issue predictions about upcoming 
performances (Drever et al., 2007). The capital markets offer substantial rewards for publicly- 
listed companies that beat the forecasts and penalties for companies that miss the forecasts. Thus, 
beating analyst’s forecasts is particularly important for those companies because their share 
returns depend on how well they perform relative to the expectations, which will also influence 
the ability of those companies to raise funds from the debt and equity markets (Brealey et al., 
2011; Jensen, Murphy, & Wruck, 2004). In addition, in many publicly-listed companies, top 
management’s compensation is linked to the company’s performance metrics, such as share 
performance, as part of the incentive compensation package to align the interests of managers 
and shareholders (Brealey et al., 2011). However, such incentive plans may tempt managers to 
                                                          
3
 Information asymmetry refers to a situation in which some parties have access to certain relevant information that 
is not available to others (Deegan & Samkin, 2011).   
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use their discretion over financial reporting practices to manipulate earnings upwards to conceal 
poor underlying company performance, for their own interests. Hence, earnings management 
creates a potential agency cost when managers focus more on the short-term wealth of the 
company, rather than on its long-term wealth. 
 
Prior studies also reveal that managers are tempted towards earnings management in takeover 
and management buyout settings (Easterwood, 1998; Guan, Wright, & Sun, 2004; Begley, Eaton, 
& Peck, 2003; Wu, 1997). Managers of takeover targets have greater incentives to manage 
earnings upwards to inflate stock prices and deal value prior to takeover offers in an attempt to 
inhibit the takeover and to dissuade the shareholders from supporting the takeover (Easterwood, 
1998; Guan et al., 2004). This managerial behaviour serves to protect managers from being 
dismissed after the takeover. In a management buyout, however, managers are inclined to make 
the company performance less favourable or to manage earnings downwards in the periods 
preceding the management buyout to reduce the company’s value and the acquisition price of the 
company (Begley et al., 2003; Wu, 1997). This again, illustrates that earnings management is an 
agency problem because, for the sake of managers, it distorts the transparency of financial 
information and prevents shareholders from making informed decisions for their own short-term 
and long-term interests. 
14 
 
2.3 Audit Committee Size 
A large audit committee improves financial reporting quality in two main ways. DeZoort et al. 
(2002), in synthesizing the empirical literature on audit committee effectiveness, identified 
resources as one of the key factors contributing to audit committee effectiveness in overseeing 
the financial reporting process. They allege that, to have sufficient resources, an audit committee 
should have an adequate number of members to generate a substantive discussion and to consider 
emerging issues, especially those raised by external auditors, in audit committee meetings. 
Hence, firstly, a large audit committee will bring diverse perspectives to the questioning of the 
management and external auditors and will encourage shared knowledge among the members, 
who may have unequal access to inside information of the company, thereby allowing effective 
monitoring by the audit committee in the preparation of the financial statements 
(Krishnamoorthy, Wright, & Cohen, 2002). Secondly, it is more difficult for managers to exert 
pressure on a large audit committee to make the committee agree with their judgments on 
material issues and to resist adjustments proposed by external auditors (Pucheta-Martinez & 
Fuentes, 2007). A large audit committee better serves as an intermediary between managers and 
external auditors than does a small committee, because a large audit committee has a greater 
organizational status and is more powerful in solving disagreements between managers and 
external auditors (Braiotta, Colson, & Robert, 2010). Thus, the likelihood of earnings 
management being practised by managers can be minimized.  
 
Despite some literature reporting a significant positive association between audit committee size 
and financial reporting quality, there are also many studies suggesting no positive relationship 
between audit committee size and financial reporting quality (Davidson et al., 2005; Saleh et al., 
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2007; Pucheta-Martinez & Fuentes, 2007). Davidson et al. (2005) study the effectiveness of 
internal governance structures in monitoring earnings management using a broad, cross-sectional 
sample of 434 ASX listed companies for the financial year ending in 2000. Using two different 
models of earnings management, namely the cross-sectional modified Jones model and small 
increases in earnings, the findings of both models confirm that audit committee size has no 
significant association with earnings management
4
. They argue that audit committee size is not a 
powerful proxy for audit committee effectiveness. However, a limitation of their study is a 
problem in their sample selection that could lead to potential bias in their findings. The sample 
fails to exclude firms in the mining, oil, gas and utilities industries. Similarly to firms in the 
finance industry, these firms have a unique nature of operations and some firms are controlled to 
a great extent by the governments. The nature of their operations will directly influence the 
exercise of earnings management over the undertaking and the reporting of business activities, 
which cannot be effectively captured by the Jones model, because the model is specifically 
designed for firms in standard industries (Klein, 2002; Wells, 2002). In Davidson et al.’s (2005) 
study, firms from those industries represent approximately 33 percent of the sample, which could 
have a material impact on the robustness of their findings. 
 
Consistent with Davidson et al.’s (2005) findings, Saleh et al. (2007), who employ the cross-
sectional Jones model, also cannot find a negative association between earnings management and 
audit committee size in Malaysian public companies
5
. While a large audit committee has greater 
monitoring capacity, Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) also assert that the benefit might be 
outweighed by the marginal cost of poorer coordination, communication and the decision 
                                                          
4
 Davidson et al. (2005) operationalized audit committee size into the number of members in the committee. 
5
 Saleh et al. (2007) also operationalized audit committee size into the number of members in the committee. 
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making process if the audit committee is oversized
6
. This allows managers to easily influence the 
judgment of audit committee members in favour of the managers. The mixed findings of the 
prior studies, however, suggest that an audit committee should be large enough to generate a 
balance of views and expertise, yet small enough to operate efficiently.  
 
Given the NZX’s recommendation that an audit committee of each issuer should have at least 
three members, this study hypothesizes that (stated in the alternative form):  
H1: The presence of an audit committee with at least three members is negatively related to 
earnings management.  
 
2.4 Audit Committee Independence 
Regulations in some countries, such as SOX in the U.S.A., have moved towards the international 
best practice that an audit committee should be comprised solely of independent directors, while 
some countries like Australia and New Zealand require a majority of audit committee members 
to be independent directors (SEC, 2002; ASX CGC, 2003; NZX Limited, 2012). According to 
the NZSX listing rules, a director is deemed independent when he or she is not an executive 
officer of the issuer and has no direct or indirect interest or relationship that could reasonably 
influence, in a material way, his or her decisions in relation to the issuer (NZX Limited, 2012).  
 
The prior literature suggests that audit committee independence is essential to ensure the 
effectiveness of the audit committee’s oversight function for three reasons. First, independent 
members are better able to adopt a probing attitude and to challenge management’s judgment in 
                                                          
6
 Pucheta-Martinez and Fuentes (2007) find that downsizing an audit committee reduces the likelihood of receiving 
a qualified audit report in Spanish firms. 
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financial matters in an unrestricted manner, because they do not have any financial or 
psychological ties to the management that may interfere with their objective judgment 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003). Second, independent audit committee members generally have 
a good reputation as financial monitors in the company, so they tend to suffer from greater 
reputational damage from lawsuits than non-independent members do when an accounting 
failure occurs (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004). Thus, they are more motivated to demonstrate 
their monitoring capability of the financial reporting process in order to build their reputations 
(Abbott et al., 2004; Goodwin, 2003). Third, audit committees with independent directors can 
strengthen the position of the internal auditors, by serving as an independent forum for them to 
report matters that affect managers, thereby improving the effectiveness of the internal audit 
function in discovering and controlling financial reporting problems (Braiotta et al., 2010; 
Raghunandan, Read, & Rama, 2001). It is also found that highly independent audit committees 
work closer and meet more regularly with internal auditors to overcome the problem of 
information asymmetry when reviewing financial statements and internal audit work, because 
independent audit committees do not have direct access to the same level of information as 
managers do (Goodwin & Yeo, 2001).  
 
Prior studies have shown a significant negative relationship between earnings management and 
audit committee independence, using various measurements of independence. Using a sample of 
687 large, publicly-traded U.S.A. firms in 1992 and 1993, and the cross-sectional Jones model to 
measure earnings management, Klein (2002) finds that the magnitude of earnings management is 
lower for companies that have audit committees comprised of a majority of independent 
directors. Interestingly, Klein (2002) finds no significant association between earnings 
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management and 100% audit committee independence. This finding is consistent with Kuang 
(2007), who finds a negative relationship between earnings management and audit committees 
with a majority of independent directors, but not with audit committees with solely independent 
directors, in New Zealand issuers. In contrast, Bedard et al. (2004) find a significant negative 
relationship between an audit committee with all independent directors and earnings 
management. Bedard et al. (2004) rank 3,451 U.S.A. firms in 1996 based on the size of abnormal 
accruals and select 100 firms with the highest income-increasing abnormal accruals (signifying 
aggressive earnings management), 100 firms with the highest income-decreasing abnormal 
accruals (also signifying aggressive earnings management), and 100 firms with the lowest 
abnormal accruals (low earnings management). They then compare the two groups with 
aggressive earnings management with the group with low earnings management. Their findings 
support the SOX 2002 requirement that an audit committee should comprise solely independent 
directors. Furthermore, prior studies find that the greater the proportion of independent directors 
in the audit committee, the more effective is the committee in controlling earnings management 
(Xie et al., 2003).  
 
Given the NZX’s recommendation on audit committee independence, the expectations above 
lead to the second hypothesis of this study: 
H2: The presence of an audit committee with a majority of independent members is negatively 
related to earnings management.  
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2.5 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
As with the SOX and the U.K. Corporate Governance Code, the NZSX listing rules recommend 
that an audit committee should have at least one member with an adequate accounting or 
financial background (SEC, 2002; FRC, 2012; NZX Limited, 2012).) An audit committee 
member is deemed to have an adequate accounting or financial background if “he or she is a 
member of NZICA, or has held a Chief Financial Officer position at an issuer for a period greater 
than 24 months, or has successfully completed a course approved by the NZX for audit 
committee membership, or has the experience and/or qualifications deemed satisfactory by the 
board” (NZX Limited, 2012, p.45). This requirement implies that the audit committee member 
must not only be financially literate, but must also possess financial expertise.   
 
Audit committee financial expertise is a critical component of audit committee effectiveness in 
two ways. First, financial expertise is associated with a greater ability to resolve problematic 
reporting issues. Audit committee members with professional accounting or finance 
qualifications have greater competency in handling grey areas and will not just blindly follow 
GAAP (Krishnamoorthy et al., 2002). Such financial experts possess the necessary knowledge 
about technical auditing and accounting matters, hence they are inclined to invest more effort in 
areas critical to financial reporting quality to detect potential accounting issues. They are 
prompted to ensure effective internal control and risk management is in place, require greater 
external audit scope and make better comprehension and judgments when reviewing financial 
statements and the work of the internal and external auditors (Abbott et al., 2004; 
Krishnamoorthy et al., 2002). This quality assists audit committees to monitor and detect 
earnings management.  
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Second, audit committee financial expertise leads to greater support for auditors in auditor-
management disagreements. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) examine factors influencing the 
judgments of 68 Canadian audit committee members in a dispute between the external auditor 
and corporate management over a material accounting policy choice. Their study finds that audit 
committee members equipped with auditing knowledge will better understand the external 
auditor’s judgment and are more likely to support the auditor in an auditor-corporate 
management dispute. This finding is further supported by a U.S.A. survey study conducted by 
Krishnamoorthy et al. (2002), who find that an audit committee lacking financial experts has 
reduced ability to mediate disagreements between management and the external auditors. This, 
again, suggests that audit committee expertise is an essential element in its monitoring role.  
 
Previous research finds that audit committee expertise plays a vital role in monitoring earnings 
management. Bedard et al. (2004) and Kuang (2007) report a negative association between 
aggressive earnings management and audit committees with at least one financial expert. 
Furthermore, Xie et al. (2003) and Baxter and Cotter (2009) find earnings management is 
negatively related to the proportion of financial experts in the committees. Collectively, these 
studies suggest that the effectiveness of an audit committee in its oversight process is primarily 
affected by the expertise of its members in the areas of financial reporting, internal control and 
auditing. Thus, this study posits that:  
H3: The presence of an audit committee with at least one member possessing accounting or 
financial expertise, as per the NZX’s recommendation, is negatively related to earnings 
management.  
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2.6 Audit Committee Diligence 
While audit committee size, independence and expertise are the primary inputs to audit 
committee effectiveness, the audit committee is not effective if the committee lacks diligence in 
its oversight process (DeZoort et al., 2002). The most common proxy for audit committee 
diligence used in previous research is the frequency of audit committee meetings (DeZoort et al., 
2002; Abbott et al., 2004). The NZSX listing rules require issuers’ audit committees to meet 
regularly in order to effectively discharge their responsibilities, yet they do not specify the 
number of committee meetings per year that is optimal to carry out the committee’s duties (NZX 
Limited, 2012). Despite the frequency of audit committee meetings being dependent on the 
objectives, scope of activities, size and nature of the company, it should coincide with the 
company’s reporting and audit cycles. Thus, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003) suggests that audit 
committee meetings of at least three to four times a year are preferable. 
 
A number of prior studies show that the frequency of audit committee meetings is positively 
associated with financial reporting quality (Abbott et al., 2004; McMullen & Raghunandan, 
1996; Xie et al., 2002). Xie et al. (2002) examine the role of the board and audit committee in 
monitoring earnings management based on 282 firms listed in the S&P 500 Index in the years 
1992, 1994 and 1996. Their study finds that audit committees in U.S.A. firms meet, on average, 
three to four times a year, and that audit committee meeting frequency is negatively associated 
with earnings management. Similarly, it is found that audit committees of firms with financial 
restatements meet less frequently than those of firms without restatements (Abbott et al., 2004).  
All these findings support the assertion that regular meetings provide opportunities to audit 
committee members to review and discuss financial and control-related matters on a timely basis 
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and to keep them informed of the progress of material issue resolution, thereby actively 
functioning audit committees have a greater ability to detect earnings management (McMullen & 
Raghunandan, 1996).  
 
Nevertheless, some studies show that the frequency of audit committee meetings does not 
contribute to audit committee effectiveness in monitoring earnings management. In Bedard et 
al.’s (2004) study, the frequency of audit committee meetings is measured with a dummy 
variable, which equals 1 if the audit committee holds at least three meetings a year, or 0 
otherwise. They fail to find a significant negative relationship between the frequency of audit 
committee meetings and earnings management in U.S.A. companies. This finding is consistent 
with that of Saleh et al.’s (2007) study of Malaysian public companies, and to that of Davidson et 
al.’s (2005) study of ASX listed companies7.  
 
The mixed research findings in this area suggest that the frequency of audit committee meetings 
may not be an effective proxy for audit committee diligence or activity, despite its widespread 
use in the research. This is because the proxy lacks meaningful substance when audit committee 
diligence is only quantified by the frequency of meetings (Saleh et al., 2007; Wu, 2012). For 
instance, the number of meetings does not capture the extent of work accomplished and the level 
of participation in the meetings. Despite the limitations of this proxy, as with prior studies, this 
study will employ the frequency of audit committee meetings as a proxy for audit committee 
diligence, because audit committee meetings in all NZX listed companies are expected to be an 
                                                          
7
 Saleh et al. (2007) and Davidson et al. (2005) operationalized audit committee diligence into the number of audit 
committee meetings in the study year. 
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effective measure of diligence, as they are facilitated by agendas
8
. Detailed written agendas, 
specifying the topics to be addressed in the audit committee meetings, are prepared and 
distributed to the members prior to the meetings to enable them to prepare (Wu, 2012). This will 
ensure that each meeting’s objectives are accomplished and unsolved issues from the previous 
meeting can be followed up. In this way, the problems of work overload and unsolved issues that 
may be faced by audit committees in the year-end peak reporting period can be prevented, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of earnings management (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003).  
 
Since the NZX does not define “regular meetings”, this study uses the best practice suggested by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003) that audit committee meetings should be conducted at least three 
to four times per year, and hypothesizes that:   
H4: An audit committee that meets at least quarterly is negatively related to earnings 
management.  
 
2.7 Summary  
There have been a number of empirical studies investigating the relationships between audit 
committee characteristics and earnings management for different countries and different results 
have been reported. Table 2.1 gives a summary of the empirical studies. These studies find 
conflicting results in the U.S.A, Australia and Malaysia. This can be due to the different 
measures of earnings management and audit committee characteristics adopted in those studies. 
                                                          
8
 In the study of audit committee effectiveness in  NZX listed companies by Wu (2012) , all interviewees (audit 
committee members) indicate that audit committee meetings in their companies are facilitated by agendas to ensure 
the committee members are effective in carrying out their tasks in the meetings. This forms the expectation in this 
study that the meetings of audit committees in NZX listed companies are effective and can signify the level of work 
accomplished by actively functioning audit committees. Hence, the frequency of audit committee meetings can be 
an effective proxy for audit committee diligence in this study. 
24 
 
In New Zealand, the single prior study shows that audit committee independence and financial 
expertise are negatively related to aggressive earnings management (Kuang, 2007). However, 
there is still a lack of research about the monitoring effect of other audit committee 
characteristics, such as diligence, on earnings management. There is a need to investigate this 
issue for New Zealand companies. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of Empirical Research on the Relationship between Audit Committee Characteristics and Earnings 
Management 
Authors Period Country Audit committee related variables 
Size 
 
Independence Financial 
expertise 
Diligence Other 
Kent et 
al. (2010) 
2004 Australia  Negative 
association 
with the 
number of 
audit 
committee 
members 
 Negative 
association with 
the proportion of 
independent audit 
committee 
members 
 No association 
with the 
proportion of 
financial experts 
on audit 
committees 
 Negative 
association 
with the 
frequency of 
audit 
committee 
meetings 
 
Baxter & 
Cotter 
(2009) 
2001 Australia  No association 
with the 
number of 
audit 
committee 
members 
 No association 
with the 
proportion of 
independent audit 
committee 
members 
 Negative 
association with 
the proportion of 
financial experts 
on audit 
committees 
 No association 
with the 
frequency of 
audit 
committee 
meetings  
 
Kuang 
(2007) 
2004 to 
2005 
New 
Zealand 
 No association 
with audit 
committees 
with at least 
three members 
 Negative 
association with 
audit committees 
with a majority 
of independent 
directors 
 No association 
with fully 
independent audit 
committees 
 Negative 
association with 
audit committees 
with at least one 
financial expert 
 Negative 
association with 
the proportion of 
financial experts 
on audit 
committees 
  Positive 
association with 
audit committee 
members’ 
shareholdings 
and multiple 
directorships 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
Authors Period Country Audit committee related variables 
Size 
 
Independence Financial 
expertise 
Diligence Other 
Koh, 
Laplante, 
& Tong 
(2007) 
1998 to 
2000 
Australia   Negative 
association with 
audit committees 
comprising a 
majority of non-
executives  
  Negative 
association 
with the 
frequency of 
audit 
committee 
meetings  
 
Saleh et al. 
(2007) 
2001 Malaysia   No 
association 
with the 
number of 
audit 
committee 
members 
 Negative 
association with 
fully independent 
audit committees 
 No association 
with the 
proportion of 
financial 
experts on 
audit 
committees 
 No association 
with the 
frequency of 
audit 
committee 
meetings  
 Negative 
association with 
the interaction of 
financial 
expertise and 
diligence of audit 
committees 
Rahman & 
Ali (2006) 
2002 to 
2003 
Malaysia    No association 
with the proportion 
of independent 
audit committee 
members 
 No association 
with audit 
committees 
with at least 
one financial 
expert 
 No association 
with the 
frequency of 
audit 
committee 
meetings  
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Authors Period Country Audit committee related variables 
Size 
 
Independence Financial 
expertise 
Diligence Other 
Davidson 
et al. 
(2005) 
2000 Australia  No 
association 
with the 
number of 
audit 
committee 
members 
 Negative 
association with 
audit committees 
comprising a 
majority of non-
executives  
 No association 
with audit 
committees 
comprised solely 
of non-executives 
  No 
association 
with the 
frequency of 
audit 
committee 
meetings  
 
Yang & 
Krishnan 
(2005) 
1996 to 
2000 
The 
U.S.A 
 Negative 
association 
with the 
number of 
audit 
committee 
members 
 No association 
with the proportion 
of independent 
audit committee 
members 
 No association 
with audit 
committees 
with at least 
one financial 
expert 
 No 
association 
with the 
frequency of 
audit 
committee 
meetings 
 Negative 
associations with 
the average 
number of outside 
directorships held 
by and the average 
tenure of audit 
committee 
members 
 Positive 
association with 
the percentage of 
stock ownership 
by audit 
committee 
members  
Table 2.1 (Continued) 
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Authors Period Country Audit committee related variables 
Size 
 
Independence Financial 
expertise 
Diligence Other 
Bedard et 
al. (2004) 
1996 The 
U.S.A 
 No association 
with audit 
committees 
with at least 
three members 
 Negative 
association with 
fully independent 
audit committees 
 Negative 
association with 
audit 
committees with 
at least one 
financial expert 
 
 No association 
with audit 
committee 
meetings of at 
least three 
times per year 
 Negative 
association with 
the governance 
expertise of 
audit committee 
members 
 No association 
with firm-
specific 
expertise of 
audit committee 
members  
Xie et al. 
(2003) 
1992, 
1994 
and 
1996 
The 
U.S.A 
 No association 
with the 
number of 
audit 
committee 
members 
 No association 
with the proportion 
of independent 
audit committee 
members 
 Negative 
association with 
the proportion 
of financial 
experts on audit 
committees 
 Negative 
association 
with the 
frequency of 
audit 
committee 
meetings 
 
Klein 
(2002) 
1992 to 
1993 
The 
U.S.A 
  Negative 
association with 
audit committees 
with a majority of 
independent 
members. 
 No association 
with fully 
independent audit 
committees  
   
Table 2.1 (Continued) 
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains four sections. The first section describes the measurements of the variables 
used in the testing model. The variables include earnings management, audit committee variables 
and control variables. The second section describes the multiple linear regression model to be 
used as the testing model of this study, in both the main analysis for the NZX Main Board 
companies and the additional analysis for the combined NZX Main Board and the Alternative 
Market companies. The third section will describe the sample selection process for the main 
analysis and the additional analysis, while the last section explains the data collection approach 
and the diagnostics tests for the data.  
 
3.2 Measurement of Variables 
3.2.1 Measurement of Earnings Management 
As noted by Kuang (2007) and Davidson et al. (2005), established proxies for earnings 
management used in the previous research include the assessment of accounting policy changes, 
specific accounting transactions, small profits or small changes in earnings and discretionary 
accruals (DAC). However, in contemporary earnings management research, DAC models have 
become the dominant measure of earnings management. The two most popular DAC models are 
the cross-sectional Jones DAC model (Jones, 1991) and the modified cross-sectional Jones DAC 
model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). These two DAC models define DAC or abnormal 
accruals as the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals. The Jones 
model uses only two independent variables, namely changes of revenues and gross property, 
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plant and equipment (PPE), to estimate changes in normal or non-discretionary accruals caused 
by changing underlying economic conditions of the company (Jones, 1991). Changes of revenues 
are objective measures of changes in the economic environment of the company, and hence, are 
included in the Jones model to control for their effect on working capital accruals. PPE is 
included to control for the portion of total accruals related to nondiscretionary depreciation 
expense. However, a key limitation underlying the Jones model is that corporate managers can 
still use credit sales to manage earnings by recognizing the sales revenue in the desired period. 
Thus, Dechow et al. (1995) modified the Jones model by deducting the change in receivables 
from the change in revenues, improving the power of the Jones model in detecting discretionary 
accruals. While the ability of these two DAC models in measuring earnings management has 
been challenged, because they neglect many factors, such as the size, debt and growth of the 
company, which will also affect accruals, the modified Jones model is still the best approach to 
detect earnings management since there are no better alternatives in the present research (Chen, 
2011). Hence, this study will adopt the cross-sectional modified Jones model to estimate 
earnings management for NZX listed companies. In employing the modified Jones model, total 
accruals (TAC) are decomposed into non-discretionary accruals (NDAC) and discretionary 
accruals (DAC), as shown in equation (1). NDAC are estimates that represent changes in the 
underlying economic performance of the company, while DAC are open to managers’ discretion 
and hence are operationalized as a proxy for earnings management.   
 (1) 
where TACi,j,t  is the total accruals for company i in industry j in year t; NDACi,j,t  and DACi,j,t  are 
the non-discretionary accruals and the discretionary accruals respectively for company i in 
industry j in year t. TACi,j,t  is computed using the cash flow approach, instead of the balance 
TACi,j,t  = NDACi,j,t  + DACi,j,t 
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sheet approach. The cash flow approach provides more accurate accruals’ estimates, because 
measurement errors in accruals estimates introduced by the balance sheet approach can be 
substantial when  non-operating activities like mergers and acquisitions, divestitures and foreign 
currency translations are present (Hribar & Collins, 2002)
9
. The cash flow approach involves 
deducting the operating cash flows (OCFi,j,t ) from the net income (NIi,j,t ).  
(2) 
To eliminate industry-specific effects on the accrual behaviour of each company, the Jones 
model is applied for each industry portfolio to estimate the industry specific regression 
coefficients, αj,t, β1j,t and β2j,t in Equation (3) (Dechow et al., 1995; Rahman & Ali, 2006; 
Davidson et al., 2005). Based on previous findings, the average estimate of β1j,t is predicted to be 
positive because changes in revenues are expected to be positively related to working capital 
accruals, while β2j,t. is expected to be negative as the level of PPE will drive depreciation 
expenses, and hence, is related to income-decreasing accruals (Jones, 1991; Davidson et al., 
2005; Saleh et al., 2007). All variables of the regression are deflated by the lagged total assets 
(TAi,j,t-1) to reduce heteroskedasticity because lagged total assets are assumed to be positively 
associated with the variance of the error term, εi,j,t (Jones, 1991). 
        
         
      
 
         
        
         
         
        
        
         
                            (3) 
Then, DACi,j,t  is computed as the difference between TACi,j,t  and NDACi,j,t, using Equation (4), 
where NDAC is calculated using the modified Jones model.  
          
        
         
       
 
         
        
                   
         
         
        
         
 }                     (4) 
                                                          
9
 Hribar and Collins (2002) demonstrate that in the cases of mergers, acquisitions, divestitures and foreign currency 
translations, the balance sheet working capital changes do not articulate with accruals from the income statement 
that are reflected in the statement of cash flows.  The biases can create substantial errors when the balance sheet 
approach is used to estimate accruals. Thus, in this study, the cash flow approach is used.  
TACi,j,t  = NIi,j,t  - OCFi,j,t 
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where: 
TAi,j,t-1 is the total assets for company i in industry j at the end of the prior year; 
ΔREVi,j,t  is the change in revenue for company i in industry j between year t and t-1; 
ΔRECi,j,t  is the change in receivables for company i in industry j between year t and t-1; 
PPEi,j,t  is the gross property, plant and equipment for company i in industry j in year t; 
α j,t, β1j,t and β2j,t are the industry-specific estimates of coefficients obtained from Equation (3) 
 
3.2.2 Measurement of Audit Committee Variables 
The independent variables of this study, namely audit committee size (ACSIZE_3), independence 
(ACINDP51), financial expertise (ACEXPERT_1) and frequency of committee meetings 
(FMEETING_4), and their measurements are summarized in Table 3.1. The measurements of 
audit committee size, independence and financial expertise are consistent with the NZX 
recommendations. ACSIZE_3 is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the audit committee 
consists of at least three members, and 0 otherwise. ACINDP51 is a dummy variable with a value 
of 1 if 51-99% of audit committee members are independent directors, and 0 otherwise. 
ACEXPERT_1 is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the audit committee has at least one 
member with accounting or finance expertise per the NZX’s definition, and 0 otherwise. Since 
the NZX does not recommend an ideal frequency of audit committee meetings in a year, this 
study uses the best practice suggested by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003) that audit committee 
meetings should be conducted at least three to four times per year, by measuring FMEETING_4 
as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the audit committee meets at least four times a year, 
and 0 otherwise. 
33 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of Variable Operationalization and Expected Sign of Hypothesis Testing 
Variables Definition Operationalization Expected sign  Test 
Independent variables    
ACSIZE_3 Audit committee size A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the audit 
committee consists of at least 3 members, and 0 
otherwise 
- H1 
ACINDP51 Audit committee 
independence  
A dummy variable with a value of 1 if 51-99% of 
audit committee members are independent 
directors, and 0 otherwise  
- H2 
ACEXPERT_1 Audit committee 
expertise 
A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the audit 
committee has at least one member with accounting 
or finance expertise per NZX’s definition, and 0 
otherwise 
- H3 
FMEETING_4 Frequency of audit 
committee meetings 
A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the audit 
committee meets at least four times a year, and 0 
otherwise 
- H4 
 
Control variables  
   
BIG4 External auditor A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company 
is audited by Big 4 auditors, and 0 otherwise 
-  
SIZE Firm size Natural log of total assets -  
ROA Firm performance Absolute net income divided by total assets  +  
LEV Firm leverage  Total liabilities to total assets ratio +  
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3.2.3 Measurement of Control Variables 
Besides showing the independent variables, Table 3.1 also summarizes the measurements of the 
control variables that will be included in the model used in this study. In choosing control 
variables, the earnings management literature has been reviewed to identify any governance and 
firm-related variables that could possibly affect earnings management. In this study, four control 
variables are chosen and will be controlled for their effect on earnings management.  
 
Consistent with prior studies, external auditor (BIG4) is controlled for (Davidson et al., 2005; 
Rahman & Ali, 2006). Companies employing Big 4 auditors tend to report lower levels of 
abnormal accruals than companies employing non-Big 4 auditors, because Big 4 auditors have 
better accounting expertise, are more likely to detect questionable accounting practices, and to 
some extent may compel managers to make necessary adjustments to their accounting practices 
to comply with the accounting standards
10
 (Krishnan, 2003).  Hence, this study expects 
companies that employ Big 4 auditors to be less likely to engage in earnings management.     
 
This study will also control for three firm-related variables that have been found to be associated 
with earnings management in the prior research. The size of the sample company (SIZE), which 
is represented by the natural log of book value of total assets, is controlled because smaller firms 
are less scrutinized by external governance bodies, such as regulators and rating agencies, and 
are more inclined to manipulate earnings (Davidson et al., 2005; Rahman & Ali, 2006; Saleh et 
                                                          
10
 Krishnan (2003) examines the link between earnings management and Big 6 auditors’ expertise for the 10-year 
period from 1989 to 1998. Note that one of the Big 6 auditors, Coopers and Lybrand merged with Price Waterhouse 
to form PricewaterhouseCoopers in 1998, whereas Arthur Andersen was removed from the Big 5 auditors list in 
2002 after the revelation of the Enron accounting fraud. This leaves the Big 4 auditors in the market today. 
35 
 
al., 2007). SIZE is therefore expected to be negatively related to earnings management. This 
study also controls for the effect of company performance (ROA), measured by absolute net 
income divided by total assets, because estimated discretionary accruals are greater in companies 
that perform very poorly or in a very superior way.  So, ROA is expected to be positively 
associated with earnings management (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005). Leverage (LEV), 
measured by the total liabilities to total assets ratio, is controlled because companies 
experiencing financial difficulties, or when they are close to debt covenant violations, face 
higher bankruptcy risks, so they have a greater incentive to manage earnings (Klein, 2002; Saleh 
et al., 2007).  
 
3.3 Multiple Linear Regression Model 
A multiple linear regression model is used in this study because the analysis involves only one 
quantitative dependent variable and at least two predictor variables (Nieuwenhuis, 2009). The 
functional form of the regression model can be expressed as: 
DAC = f (ACSIZE_3, ACINDP51, ACEXPERT_1, FMEETING_4, BIG4, SIZE, ROA, LEV) + ε 
where DAC is the absolute value of estimated discretionary accruals in order to include the 
combined effect of income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management. ε is an error 
term, while the independent and control variables are defined in Table 3.1. The expected 
association for each hypothesis test is also stated in Table 3.1. This testing model is used in both 
the main analysis for the NZX Main Board and the additional analysis for the combined NZX 
Main Board and the Alternative Market.  
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3.4 Sample Selection 
This study involves a cross-sectional analysis of companies listed on the NZX. For the main 
analysis of this study, the sample - which is pooled - is selected from all companies listed on the 
NZX Main Board for the financial years ending in 2011 and 2012. Pooling of data is acceptable, 
because the relationships being estimated are expected to be temporarily stable over the two-year 
period (Kuang, 2007; Wooldridge, 2012). Due to the small size of the New Zealand public equity 
market, the sample size of this study is initially the whole population of listed companies on the 
NZX Main Board, which is 225 companies, after excluding 20 overseas companies. All 
companies are categorized according to the NZX industry descriptors (see Appendix A). This 
study excludes companies in the Finance, Investment, Mining and Energy industries, leaving a 
sample size of 158. Companies in the Finance and Investment industries are excluded because 
these companies are highly regulated and have a unique and different working capital structure 
that affects their accrual practices (Klein, 2002; Kuang, 2007). Companies in the Mining and 
Energy industries are excluded because their operation is greatly influenced by government 
regulations, such as the Electricity Industry Act 2010 (Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2012; 
Wells, 2002). Their incentives and opportunities to manage earnings are different from standard 
companies and cannot be captured effectively by the DAC model (Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 
2001; Rahman & Ali, 2006). Furthermore, industries with less than ten companies will be 
eliminated from the sample, because of insufficient observations in each industry to estimate the 
industry-specific coefficients of the regression in Equation 3 (Dechow et al., 1995; Bedard et al., 
2004; Kothari et al., 2005). This reduces the sample size to 126. The final sample of 82 is 
determined after removing companies with unavailable annual reports, financial data or 
governance information. A summary of the sample selection is shown in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Sample Selection for Main Analysis 
 Number 
Total companies listed on the NZX Main Board for the 2011 and 2012 years 225 
Less Companies in Finance industry (14) 
Less Companies in Investment industry (32) 
Less Companies in Energy industry (14) 
Less Companies in Mining industry (9) 
Less Industries with less than 10 observations  
         Media and Telecommunications (7) 
         Building Materials and Construction (6) 
         Leisure and Tourism 
         Food and Beverages 
(8) 
(5) 
         Textiles and Apparel 
Less Companies with unavailable annual reports or missing data 
Final sample  
(4) 
(44) 
82 
In consideration of the small sample size used in the main analysis, an additional analysis is 
conducted, with a larger sample comprised of companies listed on both the NZX Main Board and 
the Alternative Market. The main analysis does not include companies in the Alternative Market 
in the sample, because these firms are subject to different listing rules and regulations, such as 
flexible reporting and corporate governance requirements, that the empirical model may fail to 
consider, affecting the precision of the model. A further reason for repeating the main analysis 
with companies listed on both the NZX Main Board and the Alternative Market is to permit 
comparisons of this study’s results with those of Kuang (2007).  
 
As in the main analysis, a similar sample selection approach is used in this analysis.  Companies 
in the Finance, Investment, Energy and Mining industries are excluded because their working 
capital structure and operational regulations are different from standard companies and cannot be 
effectively captured by the DAC model (Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2001; Rahman & Ali, 2006). 
Furthermore, industries with less than ten companies will be eliminated from the sample due to 
insufficient observations in each industry to estimate industry-specific coefficients (Dechow et 
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al., 1995; Bedard et al., 2004; Kothari et al., 2005). Companies with unavailable annual reports, 
financial data or governance information, and outlier and influential observations are also 
removed. Table 3.3 shows how the final sample size of 102 is obtained.  
 
Table 3.3: Summary of Sample Selection for Additional Analysis 
a 
See Appendix A for the breakdown of the total listed companies by industry. 
b 
An observation is deemed to be an outlier and influential and will be deleted if its standardized 
residual > ±2, leverage > 3(k+1)/n and covariance ratio < 1-[3(k+1)/n], where k is the number of 
predictor variables and n is the number of observations (Field, 2009). 
 
 
3.5 Data Collection and Diagnostic Tests 
The financial data and the audit committee and other governance information are hand-collected 
from each company’s annual report for the financial year ending in 2011 and 2012, as published 
on the NZX or company website. This study period is chosen because it provides the most recent 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the NZX recommendations on audit committees in 
monitoring earnings management.  
 
The robustness of the linear regression model used in this study relies on three main assumptions 
of the ordinary least squares (OLS) method, namely linearity, homoskedasticity and normality 
 Number 
Total companies listed on the NZX Main Board and the Alternative Market for 
the 2011 and 2012 years
a 
270 
Less Companies in Finance industry (18) 
 Less Companies in Investment industry (44) 
Less Companies in Energy industry (18) 
Less Companies in Mining industry (11) 
Less Industries with less than 10 observations  
         Building Materials and Construction (6) 
         Textiles and Apparel 
Less Companies with unavailable annual reports or missing data 
Less Outlier and influential observations
b 
Final sample  
(4) 
(62) 
(5) 
102 
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(Field, 2009). The linearity of the dataset is tested using the RESET test; homoskedasticity is 
tested using the Breusch-Pagan test, while normality is examined using skewness, kurtosis and 
the Jarque-Bera test. The RESET and Breusch-Pagan tests show that the linearity and 
homoskedasticity assumptions of OLS are not satisfied in this study. For a standard normal 
distribution, the skewness value is zero and the kurtosis value is three (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 
2011). However, the dataset illustrates a skewness of 3.126 and a kurtosis value of 19.671. Also, 
examination of the data using the Jarque-Bera test indicates that non-normality exists in the 
residuals of the regression at the 1% significance level. The natural log transformation of the 
dependent variable is, therefore, applied to fulfil the assumptions of OLS. Other transformations 
such as square root and reciprocal transformations were undertaken, but the natural log 
transformation produces better estimation because this transformation best repairs non-normality, 
non-linearity and heteroskedasticity of the data in this study. Furthermore, the main advantage of 
using the natural log transformation of the dependent variable is that it allows interpretation of 
the regression coefficients in a natural way, in terms of percentage changes (Nieuwenhuis, 2009).  
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Chapter 4 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains three sections. The first two sections discuss the findings in the main 
analysis of the study, whereas the last section reports the results in the additional analysis. The 
first section commences with the descriptive statistics for the estimated regression coefficients of 
the Jones model and for the regression variables used in the multiple linear regression model of 
the study. A correlation matrix is also prepared to assess the multicollinearity of the variables. 
The second section of the chapter provides the results for and discussion of the hypothesis testing 
conducted for the companies listed on the NZX Main Board, whereas the last section reports the 
findings of the hypothesis testing conducted for both the NZX Main Board and the Alternative 
Market companies, undertaken to validate the robustness of the findings in the main analysis and 
to allow comparisons of this study’s results with those of Kuang. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
To assess the modified Jones model’s ability to partition total accruals into their discretionary 
and non-discretionary components, Table 4.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the model’s 
coefficients.  The average β1 coefficient (change in revenues) is negative, which is inconsistent 
with prior studies (Davidson et al., 2005; Jones, 1991). This situation can be explained by the 
minimum β1 coefficient (-0.254), which substantially pulls down the positive mean value to 
negative.  As noted by Jones (1991), the expected sign for the change in revenues’ coefficient is 
not obvious, because a given change in revenue can cause income-increasing working capital 
accruals, such as increases in accounts receivable, and income-decreasing working capital 
accruals, such as increases in accounts payable. Despite the negative mean value found in this 
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study, 66.67% of the observations are positive, which is consistent with prior studies (Saleh et 
al., 2007). This implies that 66.67% of industries exhibit a positive association between changes 
in revenues and total accruals. The β2 coefficient of property, plant and equipment is negative, as 
expected, with all the industries showing a negative association between property, plant and 
equipment and total accruals. Therefore, it appears as if the model is reasonably specified and 
has produced plausible estimates for discriminating non-discretionary accruals from total 
accruals.  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Estimated Regression Coefficients (n=6)
a 
a
 The descriptive statistics presented above are for the estimated multiple regression equation: 
 
        
         
      
 
         
         
         
         
         
        
         
         
where:  
TAC i,j,t  is total accruals for company i in industry j in year t; 
TAi,j,t-1 is the total assets for company i in industry j at the end of the prior year; 
ΔREVi,j,t  is the change in revenue for company i in industry j between year t and t-1; 
PPEi,j,t  is the gross property, plant and equipment for company i in industry j in year t; 
εi,j,t  is the error term for company i in industry j in year t; 
n is the number of industries. 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation % positive 
α coefficient -2810 2196 -1440 1888 16.67 
β1  coefficient -0.254 0.091 -0.018 0.121 66.67 
β2  coefficient -39.722 -0.012 -6.670 16.193 0.00 
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Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the regression variables used in the model of this 
study. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables, while Panel B reports 
the frequency of the dummy regression variables. 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables
a 
 
Panel A: Continuous regression variables 
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Absolute discretionary accruals (DAC)
b
 0.050 0.065 0.001 0.475 
Firm size (SIZE) 12.624 1.365 9.828 16.558 
Firm performance (ROA) 0.065 0.053 0.002 0.276 
Firm leverage (LEV) 0.428 0.180 0.003 0.842 
a 
n = 82. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
b 
Scaled by lagged total assets. 
 
Panel A indicates that the average firm has discretionary accruals of 0.050 in absolute terms, 
suggesting that, overall, NZX listed companies are exposed to relatively low earnings 
management. The firm size, measured by the natural log of total assets, has a mean value of 
12.624 and a range from 9.828 to 16.558. Furthermore, the average firm has a reported absolute 
return on total assets ratio of 6.5% and a leverage ratio of 42.8%. Panel B indicates that 95.1% of 
firms have established audit committees of at least three members, 63.4% of firms have a 
majority of independent directors on the audit committee, 82.9% of audit committees have at 
Panel B: Dummy regression variables
 
Variable Frequency of 1’s Frequency of 0’s 
Audit committee size (ACSIZE_3) 78 (95.1%) 4 (4.9%) 
Audit committee independence (ACINDP51) 52 (63.4%) 30 (36.6%) 
Audit committee expertise (ACEXPERT_1) 68 (82.9%) 14 (17.1%) 
Frequency of audit committee meetings (FMEETING_4) 43 (52.4%) 39 (47.6%) 
External auditor (BIG4) 70 (85.4%) 12 (14.6%) 
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least one financial expert, and 52.4% of audit committees meet at least quarterly. This suggests 
that a majority of NZX listed companies comply with the NZX Corporate Governance Best 
Practice Code. Panel B also shows that 85.4% of firms are audited by Big 4 audit firms.  
 
Table 4.3 reports the correlations between the independent variables in the regression model. The 
main purpose of doing the correlation matrix is to examine the extent to which each independent 
variable is related to the others. A multicollinearity problem exists when there is a high 
correlation between two or more independent variables in the regression model, causing the 
estimates of the regression coefficients to become unstable and the standard errors for the 
coefficients to become very inflated (Field, 2009). Independent variables are said to be very 
highly correlated if the correlation is above 0.80. In this study, the highest correlation is between 
firm performance (ROA) and firm size (SIZE), with the absolute value of the correlation 
coefficient 0.417. Thus, the correlation matrix suggests that there is no multicollinearity among 
the independent variables, since none of the variables correlates above 0.80.  Nevertheless, 
multicollinearity in the data is further assessed using variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance 
statistics, which involve running an auxiliary regression of each independent variable on the 
remaining independent variables. As shown in Appendix B, eight auxiliary regressions are run 
because eight independent variables are used in the study.  Multicollinearity is a concern when 
the VIF value is greater than 10 and its reciprocal (1/VIF), tolerance statistics, is below 0.10 
(Field, 2009). Also, collinearity creates a concern if the R
2
 from the auxiliary model is above 
0.80 (Hill et al., 2011). Appendix B shows that, for all of the auxiliary regression models, the R
2 
is below 0.80, the VIF values are all below 10 and the tolerance statistics are well above 0.10, 
confirming that multicollinearity is not a concern in this study.  
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Table 4.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables
a
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 5% level (2-tailed). 
a
 All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
 
  ACSIZE_3 ACINDP51 ACEXPERT_1 FMEETING_4 BIG4 SIZE ROA LEV 
ACSIZE_3 1.000 
       ACINDP51 0.298
**
 1.000 
      ACEXPERT_1 0.048 -0.143 1.000 
     FMEETING_4 0.124 -0.014 0.022 1.000 
    BIG4 0.227
*
 0.187 0.179 0.089 1.000 
   SIZE 0.278
*
 -0.064 0.200 0.162 0.297
**
 1.000 
  ROA -0.127 -0.165 -0.092 0.034 -0.262
*
 -0.417
**
 1.000 
 LEV 0.092 0.064 0.038 0.241
*
 -0.017 0.155 0.018 1.000 
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The correlation analysis in Table 4.3 also demonstrates that large-sized companies are more 
likely to have audit committees with at least three members and to be audited by Big 4 audit 
firms. These findings suggest that larger companies have greater ability to support the costs of 
large audit committees and Big 4 audit firms, so they emphasize audit quality more in terms of 
audit committee size and external audit than do small companies. These findings are consistent 
with Kuang’s findings (2007). Also, an audit committee with at least three members generally 
has a majority of independent directors on the committee (correlation coefficient = 0.298, p-
value<0.01). Furthermore, audit committees tend to meet at least quarterly when the companies 
have a high leverage ratio. This relationship can be explained by the agency theory perspective 
of monitoring that, in situations with high agency costs of debt, greater monitoring efforts by 
audit committees are needed to monitor the situation, and these monitoring needs will drive audit 
committee diligence (Collier & Gregory, 1999)
11
.  Furthermore, consistent with Davidson et al. 
(2005), the correlation matrix shows that firm performance, measured by the absolute value of 
ROA, is negatively correlated with firm size and the use of Big 4 audit firms. In other words, 
very good or very bad firm performance is more likely to exist in small companies and in 
companies that employ non-Big 4 audit firms.  
 
 
4.3 Substantive Statistics  
Table 4.4 reports the multiple linear regression results for the 82 NZX Main Board companies. 
The F-statistic shows that the model is statistically useful at the 1% significance level, with an 
                                                          
11
 The agency costs of debt occur if, when a party lends funds to another organization, the borrower undertakes 
activities that reduce or even eliminate any likelihood of the funds being repaid (Deegan & Samkin, 2011). These 
costs relate to the behaviour of the borrower diverging from that of the lender.  
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adjusted R
2 
of 0.242. This means that about 24.2% of the variation in discretionary accruals is 
explained by the model.  
 
Of the four control variables included in the model, two are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Earnings management is negatively associated with firm size (SIZE) and positively 
associated with firm leverage (LEV). These results are as predicted. However, no association 
between earnings management and the firm performance (ROA) or the use of Big 4 audit firms 
(BIG4) is found.  
Table 4.4: Multiple Linear Regression Results (n=82) 
a *
,
**
 and 
*** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (one-tailed), respectively.  
b
 The dependent variable of the regression is the natural log transformation of discretionary 
accruals, while all predictor variables are defined in Table 3.1.  
 
The results of the regression model show that the coefficient for audit committee size 
(ACSIZE_3) is not significant (coefficient = 0.185, p-value is 0.367), thus Hypothesis 1 of a 
negative relationship between audit committee size and earnings management is not supported. 
Variable
b 
Expected sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value
a 
Intercept n/a 0.172 0.130 0.897 
Audit committee variables 
ACSIZE_3 - 0.185 0.342 0.367 
ACINDP51 - -0.448 -2.044 0.022
** 
ACEXPERT_1 - -0.485 -1.621 0.055
* 
FMEETING_4 - -0.346 -1.559 0.062
* 
Control variables 
BIG4 - 0.434 0.963 0.169 
SIZE - -0.338 -3.773 0.000
*** 
ROA + 2.736 1.085 0.141 
LEV + 1.602 2.378 0.010
***
 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.242   
F-statistic  4.225   
p-value  0.000   
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This implies that there is no significant difference in the monitoring effect on earnings 
management between audit committees with at least three members and audit committees with 
less than three members. This result is not unexpected, because many prior studies have found 
that audit committee size does not play an important role in reducing earnings management in 
some countries, for instance, the U.S.A. (Xie et al., 2003), Australia (Davidson et al., 2005), 
Malaysia (Saleh et al., 2007) and New Zealand (Kuang, 2007).  
 
The second hypothesis relates to the relationship between audit committee independence and 
earnings management. The coefficient for audit committee independence (ACINDP51) is 
negative and significant at the 5% significance level (coefficient = -0.448, p-value = 0.022). This 
provides support for Hypothesis 2 that earnings management is negatively associated with audit 
committees comprised of a majority of independent directors. This result supports the NZX 
recommendation on audit committee independence and the findings of Klein (2002), Kuang 
(2007) and Davidson et al. (2005). These prior studies, however, do not find a negative 
relationship between earnings management and audit committees comprised of fully independent 
directors, as Saleh et al. (2007) and Bedard et al. (2004) do. The proposition that an entirely 
independent audit committee has a negative relationship with earnings management will be 
tested and reported later in this section. 
 
Hypothesis 3 infers that earnings management is negatively associated with the presence of at 
least one financial expert on the audit committee. The coefficient for the financial expertise of 
audit committees (ACEXPERT_1) is negative – as expected - and significant at the 10% 
significance level (coefficient = -0.485, p-value = 0.055). Hypothesis 3 is thus supported, 
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indicating that audit committees with at least one financial expert are negatively associated with 
earnings management. In other words, an audit committee must have at least one financial expert 
to monitor and reduce earnings management effectively in a New Zealand setting (Kuang, 2007).   
 
Audit committee effectiveness also relies on diligent oversight efforts, as measured by the 
frequency of committee meetings in a year. Hypothesis 4 is supported, as the coefficient for audit 
committee diligence (FMEETING_4) is negative and significant at the 10% significance level 
(coefficient = -0.346, p-value = 0.062). This means that, for New Zealand companies, earnings 
management can be reduced effectively when audit committees meet at least quarterly to 
discharge their responsibilities. Such frequent meetings keep the committees well informed about 
accounting and control-related matters and send a signal that the committees intend to remain 
vigilant and informed (McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996). This result is consistent with the prior 
empirical evidence of Xie et al. (2003) and Koh et al. (2007).  
 
As part of the main analysis, this study is interested in examining the associations between 
earnings management and different threshold levels of audit committee independence and 
diligence for companies listed on the NZX Main Board. The regression output is presented in 
Appendix C. The first test re-performs the regression model with an alternative measure of audit 
committee independence. As previous research has found contradictory results about fully 
independent audit committees, ACINDP51 is replaced with ACINDP100, a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the audit committee comprises of 100 percent independent directors, and 
0 otherwise. Consistent with the findings of the prior New Zealand study by Kuang (2007), this 
additional test finds that the coefficient for the alternative measure is not significant (coefficient 
= 0.113, p-value = 0.327), confirming that there is no association between earnings management 
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and a fully independent audit committee, although a majority of independent directors on the 
committee is related to a reduction in earnings management in New Zealand. This result also 
suggests that the stricter regulatory requirement of 100% independence for audit committees in 
the U.S.A. is not necessary in New Zealand.  This finding might be attributable to the reduction 
or loss of inside information accessible by a fully independent audit committee, as independent 
directors do not have as much direct access to information as executive directors do. An audit 
committee with a majority of independent directors (and a minority of executive directors) has 
value added in terms of an information asymmetry advantage (Klein, 1998).  
  
While the NZX does not define “regular audit committee meetings”, this study further examines 
the sensitivity of audit committee meetings to another cut-off by substituting FMEETING_4 with 
FMEETING_3, a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the committee meets at least three 
times per year and 0 otherwise. The coefficient is negative, but not significant (coefficient = -
0.277, p-value = 0.126).  The result suggests that while meeting at least three times annually 
appears to reduce earnings management, the effect is not significant. For NZX listed companies, 
the quality of audit committee diligence can only be preserved when the committee meets at least 
quarterly. Since the NZX does not specify a benchmark for the meeting frequency of audit 
committees, these findings suggest that audit committees should convene at least four times per 
year to better realize their monitoring efforts and thereby to better meet stakeholders’ 
expectations of audit committees. This additional insight into audit committee diligence should 
become an important input for regulators and practitioners to prepare new corporate governance 
regulations and practices that relate to the frequency of audit committee meetings.   
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To summarize the findings of the study so far, the coefficient for ACSIZE_3 is not statistically 
significant at either the 5% or 10% level, while the coefficients for ACINDP51, ACEXPERT_1 
and FMEETING_4 are statistically significant, although those for ACEXPERT_1 and 
FMEETING_4 are significant at the lowest significance level of 10%. These results reflect that 
audit committee effectiveness in monitoring earnings management in a New Zealand setting does 
not rely heavily on audit committee size, but on the qualities of the members, which include 
independence and financial expertise, as well as their diligence or efforts in the process of 
discharging their responsibilities.  It is the quality of the members, but not necessarily the 
committee size, that generates substantive discussions on financial reporting matters in the 
meetings and leads to effective control over earnings management. In other words, the results 
suggest that it is important for New Zealand listed companies to comply with the NZX’s 
recommendations on audit committee independence and financial expertise, and hold at least 
four times per year, but the recommendation that audit committees comprised of at least three 
members may not be necessary. As reported by Kuang (2007), the result with respect to audit 
committee size can provide some consolation to companies that are structurally or financially 
constrained to meet the corporate governance recommendations. Nevertheless, this study does 
not deny the importance of having at least three members in an audit committee, because this 
brings diverse skills, expertise and independence to the committee, all of which can enhance its 
monitoring ability.  
 
It is alleged that the smaller capital market and less stringent jurisdiction associated with 
corporate ethical conduct and accounting failures in New Zealand encourage oversight and 
monitoring negligence by company directors and misconduct of management in financial 
reporting (Kuang, 2007). While New Zealand has a high reputation for ethical practices 
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generally, Transparency International (NZ) (2010) reports that many of New Zealand’s largest 
listed companies do not adopt adequate fundamental governance practices to justify the 
confidence of stakeholders. For instance, according to Transparency International (NZ) (2010), 
only 18 percent of companies listed on the NZX 50 have policies on regulating facilitation 
payments, and only 44 percent of the NZX 50 have policies prohibiting bribery. This does not 
compare favourably with the percentage of companies prohibiting bribery in Australia (47%), the 
U.S.A. (69%) and the U.K. (72%) (Transparency International (NZ), 2010). The existence of 
poorer code of conduct systems in New Zealand listed companies could put a lot at risk, 
including shareholder wealth, employees’ jobs and New Zealand’s reputation, unless there are 
effective monitoring mechanisms, including the board of directors, for evaluating practice 
against the code (Transparency International (NZ), 2010; Securities Commission New Zealand, 
2004). Ultimately, because of deficiencies in corporate governance systems, the responsibility 
for protecting stakeholders’ interests falls on the board of directors and its committees. This 
study reports similar findings on audit committee size, independence, financial expertise and 
diligence as studies conducted in larger markets, such as Australia, which underscores the 
importance of the quality and diligence of audit committee members in moderating earnings 
management and other agency problems (Davidson et al., 2005; Koh et al., 2007; Baxter & 
Cotter, 2009). New Zealand requires strict audit committee requirements that are in line with 
larger countries’ governance practices, except for the requirement of 100% independence. 
Complying with the current NZX recommendations on audit committees is important as a means 
of strengthening the monitoring role that audit committees play in the financial reporting process.  
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4.4 Additional Analysis 
This additional analysis, whose sample population is the combined NZX Main Board and the 
Alternative Market, is conducted to validate the robustness of the main analysis, particularly 
because of the small sample size in the main analysis, and also for purposes of comparison with 
the prior New Zealand study by Kuang (2007), who combined both markets. Table 4.5 presents 
the multiple linear regression results in the analysis conducted for 102 companies listed on the 
NZX Main Board and the Alternative Market. The increased sample size produces similar results 
to the initial findings.  The F-statistic shows that the revised model remains statistically useful at 
the 1% significance level, with the adjusted R
2 
increasing slightly from 0.242 to 0.245. This 
means that about 24.5% of the variation in discretionary accruals is explained by the revised 
model.  
 
Of the four control variables included in the model, three are statistically significant. The 
coefficient for firm size (SIZE) remains negative and significant, supporting the negative 
relationship between firm size and earnings management. Earnings management is also 
positively associated with firm leverage (LEV), as predicted. In this additional analysis - unlike 
in the main analysis - the coefficient for firm performance (ROA) becomes significant at the 1% 
level. The inclusion of more firms in the model, therefore, suggests that firms with either very 
poor or very superior financial performance are prone to the practice of earnings management.  
However, similarly to the initial findings, the use of Big 4 audit firms (BIG4) is again not 
associated with earnings management. 
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Table 4.5: Multiple Linear Regression Results (n=102) 
 
As shown in Table 4.5, the coefficient for audit committee size (ACSIZE_3) remains not 
significant (coefficient = 0.197, p-value = 0.294). Hypothesis 1 is thus rejected, confirming that 
audit committee size does not play an important role in monitoring earnings management in New 
Zealand. The magnitude of the estimated effect (coefficient) for audit committee independence 
(ACINDP51) reduces from -0.448 (main findings) to -0.297, but is statistically significant at the 
10% level. Hypothesis 2 of a negative relationship between earnings management and a majority 
of independent directors on the audit committee is thus supported.  
 
Furthermore, the financial expertise of audit committees (ACEXPERT_1) remains negatively 
related to earnings management at the 10% significance level, suggesting that audit committees 
with at least one financial expert are a necessary governance factor in reducing earnings 
Variable
b 
Expected sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value
a 
Intercept n/a -2.131 -2.487 0.015
**
 
Audit committee variables 
ACSIZE_3 - 0.197 0.543 0.294 
ACINDP51 - -0.297 -1.480 0.071
*
 
ACEXPERT_1 - -0.338 -1.454 0.075
* 
FMEETING_4 - -0.511 -2.605 0.005
*** 
Control variables 
BIG4 - 0.286 1.204 0.116 
SIZE - -0.161 -2.193 0.015
** 
ROA + 6.115 3.681 0.000
***
 
LEV + 1.008 1.858 0.033
**
 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.245   
F-statistic  5.096   
p-value  0.000   
a *
,
**
 and 
*** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (one-tailed), respectively, when 
direction is predicted, otherwise two-tailed.  
b
 The dependent variable of the regression is the natural log transformation of discretionary 
accruals. All predictor variables are defined in Table 3.1.  
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management. Hypothesis 3 is supported. All of the findings about audit committee size, 
independence and financial expertise in this analysis are consistent with those of Kuang (2007).  
 
As mentioned previously, this study provides evidence about the relationship between audit 
committee diligence and earnings management in New Zealand for the first time, as there is no 
such empirical evidence for New Zealand. Compared to the initial findings, the revised model 
increases the significance of the estimated effect of audit committee diligence (FMEETING_4), 
with the estimate becoming significant at the 1% level (coefficient = -0.511, p-value = 0.005), 
whereas previously it was significant at the 10% level. Hypothesis 4 is, hence, supported. The 
monitoring effect of audit committees on earnings management appears to become more obvious 
when audit committees meet at least quarterly.  
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 Chapter 5 Conclusion 
This study examines the relationships between earnings management and audit committee size, 
independence, financial expertise and diligence per the NZX’s recommendations for NZX listed 
companies. The findings support the NZX’s recommendations regarding independence and 
financial expertise. The presence of a majority of independent directors in an audit committee is 
associated with reduced earnings management. Acknowledging that the environment within 
which New Zealand companies are operating is different from that of other developed countries, 
the study finds that stricter regulatory requirement of 100 percent independence on audit 
committees in the U.S.A. is not necessary in New Zealand. In addition, this study observes a 
negative relationship between earnings management and the presence of at least one financial 
expert on the audit committee. The result for audit committee diligence also suggests that audit 
committees that meet at least quarterly are more effective than those that do not meet at least 
quarterly, in moderating earnings management. Although the evidence does not support the 
current NZX’s recommendation concerning audit committee size, this study recognizes the 
importance of having at least three members on an audit committee, because this contributes 
diverse skills, expertise and independence to the committee. The result for audit committee size, 
however, can provide some consolation to companies that are structurally or financially 
constrained from meeting the corporate governance recommendations.  
 
The evidence from this study has implications for policy makers and corporate practitioners who 
are concerned about strengthening the corporate governance of New Zealand companies with 
respect to earnings management and financial reporting quality. In particular, the NZX may wish 
to revise its recommendation on the frequency of audit committee meeting by encouraging 
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meetings to be held at least quarterly, rather than using the term “regularly” in the NZX 
Corporate Governance Best Practice Code. It is also not necessary for New Zealand companies 
to have an audit committee with all independent directors. Furthermore, policy makers and 
practitioners should place greater emphasis on encouraging governance practices that foster audit 
committee independence, financial expertise and diligence in order to achieve value 
enhancement in financial reporting.  
 
This study contributes to policy makers’, corporate practitioners’ and academics’ understanding 
of the effectiveness of the NZX’s recommendations for audit committees in monitoring earnings 
management practices and in ensuring the integrity of financial reporting in companies operating 
in small public equity markets such as New Zealand. The findings of this study, hence, can serve 
as a benchmark for corporate governance and regulation setting in small countries with a similar 
institutional and legal environment to New Zealand. 
 
The findings of this study are subject to several limitations. First, audit committee independence, 
expertise and diligence are difficult to observe directly, so reliance on the suggested proxy 
measures is subject to criticism. For instance, audit committee members may be independent by 
the NZX’s definition, but they may not be independent in mind and are more likely to support 
management’s judgments if they have a private incentive to stay in the committee for a longer 
tenure. An evaluation of members’ expertise is based largely on publicly available proxies, such 
as certifications and prior job titles, rather than on more complete assessments of true expertise, 
such as problem-solving ability in finance and accounting (DeZoort et al, 2002). The problems 
associated with the use of the frequency of audit committee meetings as a proxy for diligence 
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have been explained previously, that is, it does not necessarily correspond to the level of work 
accomplished and the participation of members in the meetings. Second, the small sample size 
used in the study, limited by the population from which it is drawn, may have reduced the power 
of the regression model and the precision of the findings. Lastly, since this study focuses 
primarily on NZX listed companies, the findings cannot be generalized to domestic non-listed 
companies, to listed companies in industries that are excluded from this study, and to other 
developed countries with large capital markets. Future research is needed to understand the 
relationships between earnings management and the interactions between the audit committee 
characteristics. For example, an investigation into the interactive effect between audit committee 
diligence and financial expertise on earnings management can be conducted. In addition, future 
research should move beyond considering only the financial expertise of audit committee 
members, by examining other expertise and skill sets, such as industry expertise, which can 
potentially be key attributes for an audit committee to operate effectively. 
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Appendix A 
NZX Listed Companies by Industry for the 2011 and 2012 Years
a 
Industry 
Main 
Board 
Main Board and 
Alternative Market 
Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 18 26 
Building Materials and Construction 6 6 
Consumer 33 33 
Energy Processing 14 18 
Finance and Other Servicesb
 
31 35 
Food and Beverages 5 11 
Intermediate and Durables 22 22 
Investment 32 44 
Leisure and Tourism 8 10 
Media and Telecommunications 7 14 
Mining 9 11 
Ports and Transport 16 16 
Property 20 20 
Textiles and Apparel 4 4 
Total companies listed on the NZX for the 2011 and 
2012 years 225 270 
a
 20 foreign companies which are cross-listed on the NZX Main Board and 2 on the Alternative 
Market are excluded because they are subject to overseas governance regulation. 
b
 In this industry, 14 companies on the Main Board and 18 companies on the Main Board and the 
Alternative Market provide banking, financial, investment or insurance services, which are to be 
excluded from the final sample in Section 3.4. 
 
Source: NZX Limited (2013). 
64 
 
Appendix B 
 Multicollinearity Diagnostics 
 
 
 
No. Dependent variable Independent variable R
2 
Collinearity statistics 
Tolerance  VIF 
1 ACSIZE_3 ACINDP51 
ACEXPERT_1 
FMEETING_4 
SIZE 
ROA 
LEV 
BIG4 
0.195 0.881 
0.916 
0.911 
0.707 
0.762 
0.907 
0.825 
1.136 
1.091 
1.097 
1.414 
1.313 
1.103 
1.212 
2 ACINDP51 
 
ACSIZE_3 
ACEXPERT_1 
FMEETING_4 
SIZE 
ROA 
LEV 
BIG4 
0.205 0.892 
0.943 
0.908 
0.703 
0.790 
0.917 
0.845 
1.121 
1.061 
1.102 
1.423 
1.266 
1.091 
1.184 
3 ACEXPERT_1 
 
ACSIZE_3 
ACINDP51 
FMEETING_4 
SIZE 
ROA 
LEV 
BIG4 
0.084 0.806 
0.819 
0.907 
0.669 
0.759 
0.908 
0.839 
1.241 
1.222 
1.103 
1.495 
1.318 
1.101 
1.192 
4 FMEETING_4 
 
ACSIZE_3 
ACINDP51 
ACEXPERT_1 
SIZE 
ROA 
LEV 
BIG4 
0.094 0.810 
0.797 
0.916 
0.670 
0.766 
0.952 
0.822 
1.235 
1.255 
1.091 
1.492 
1.306 
1.051 
1.216 
5 SIZE 
 
ACSIZE_3 
ACINDP51 
ACEXPERT_1 
FMEETING_4 
ROA 
LEV 
BIG4 
0.338 0.861 
0.844 
0.925 
0.918 
0.908 
0.929 
0.846 
1.162 
1.184 
1.081 
1.090 
1.102 
1.077 
1.181 
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No. Dependent variable Independent variable R
2 
Collinearity statistics 
Tolerance  VIF 
6 ROA 
 
ACSIZE_3 
ACINDP51 
ACEXPERT_1 
FMEETING_4 
SIZE 
LEV 
BIG4 
0.241 
 
 
0.809 
0.828 
0.916 
0.915 
0.792 
0.912 
0.830 
1.237 
1.207 
1.091 
1.093 
1.263 
1.096 
1.205 
7 LEV 
 
ACSIZE_3 
ACINDP51 
ACEXPERT_1 
FMEETING_4 
SIZE 
ROA 
BIG4 
0.093 0.805 
0.804 
0.917 
0.951 
0.678 
0.763 
0.825 
1.242 
1.244 
1.090 
1.051 
1.475 
1.311 
1.212 
8 BIG4 ACSIZE_3 
ACINDP51 
ACEXPERT_1 
FMEETING_4 
SIZE 
ROA 
LEV 
0.182 0.812 
0.821 
0.939 
0.911 
0.685 
0.769 
0.915 
1.231 
1.218 
1.065 
1.097 
1.460 
1.300 
1.093 
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Appendix C 
Results for Alternative Audit Committee Variable Measures (n=82) 
Table A.1: Audit committee independence  
Table A.2: Audit committee diligence 
a *, **
 and 
*** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (one-tailed), respectively.  
b
 The dependent variable of the regression is the natural log transformation of discretionary 
accruals, whereas all predictor variables are defined in Table 3.1.  
Variable
b 
Expected sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value
a 
Intercept n/a -0.324 -0.234 0.816 
Audit committee variables 
ACSIZE_3 - -0.108 -0.186 0.426 
ACINDP100 - 0.113 0.4512 0.327 
ACEXPERT_1 - -0.408 -1.358 0.089
* 
FMEETING_4 - -0.324 -1.413 0.081
* 
Control variables 
BIG4 - 0.369 0.739 0.231 
SIZE - -0.303 -3.237 0.001
*** 
ROA + 3.419 1.355 0.090
*
 
LEV + 1.490 2.202 0.015
**
 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.209   
F-statistic  3.683   
p-value  0.001   
Variable
b 
Expected sign Coefficient t-Statistic p-value
a 
Intercept n/a 0.227 0.179 0.859 
Audit committee variables 
ACSIZE_3 - 0.233 0.420 0.338 
ACINDP51 - -0.487 -2.155 0.017
** 
ACEXPERT_1 - -0.512 -1.751 0.042
** 
FMEETING_3 - -0.277 -1.153 0.126
 
Control variables 
BIG4 - 0.449 0.987 0.164 
SIZE - -0.338 -3.901 0.000
*** 
ROA + 2.316 0.932 0.177 
LEV + 1.535 2.276 0.013
**
 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.228   
F-statistic  3.997   
p-value  0.001   
